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Abstract—Inherent heterogeneity of the networks increases
risk factor and new security threats emerge due to the variety
of network types and their vulnerabilities. This paper presents
an example of applied security framework – the INTERSEC-
TION. By referring to the ISO/IEC security standards and
to the FP7 INTERSECTION project results, authors under-
line that in the processes of managing and planning security,
investigating technology and business governance should be
at least as important as formalizing the need for decisions
on security cooperation between operators. INTERSECTION
provides security mechanisms and introduces capability pos-
sible only with a management solution that is at a higher level
than that of any of the connected systems alone.
Keywords—IDMEF, IDS, IPFIX, security framework.
1. Introduction
Information technology industries as well as telecommu-
nication operators are seeking eﬃcient and comprehensive
security solutions. This crucial task not only aims at pro-
viding protection against malicious or sometimes inadver-
tent attacks – it must also address the business requirements
for conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation,
accountability, authenticity, and reliability of information
and services. Still, an information system is as secure as
the weakest element of the system. In many cases network
security consists of building blocks provided by vendors
specializing in a single aspect of security. This is why in-
teroperability should be considered. Basic interoperability
could be achieved by deploying standard protocols for data
exchange between security components. Intelligence of the
system could be further enhanced with implementation of
a management component capable of aggregating such in-
formation and able to link otherwise unrelated events into
a big picture view. Such a system may provide compre-
hensive and eﬃcient security defense even in the case of
zero-day exploits. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of net-
works should be taken into consideration, as it may add new
vulnerabilities or open otherwise independent networks to
new threats.
At the same time another perspective of the same situa-
tion can be observed – there is a value in having access
to additional monitoring data for correlation in a security
framework. Turning adverse situation of supporting var-
ious and complex connections between networks into an
advantage of high level managed security solutions capable
of preventing complex attacks from spreading into multiple
networks and geographic areas may be especially interest-
ing to telecom service provides. This task is the aim of the
European research project INTERSECTION. Additionally
the project focuses on developing new anomaly detection
algorithms that can be used with the traﬃc correlation en-
gine to predict the network behavior and prevent malicious
users from accessing the network, stealing information or
disrupting a service. By detecting zero-day exploits and au-
tomated remediation the security level is further improved.
This paper is divided into sections organized as follows:
Section 2 is a summary of the related work in the ﬁeld of
security frameworks. Section 3 describes the various ISO
standards addressing telecommunication security manage-
ment and intrusion detection framework architecture. Sec-
tion 4 describes the impact of known network threats (like
viruses) on companies network and some information about
anomaly detection techniques. Section 5 describes the idea
of INTERSECTION and protocols used in framework. Sec-
tion 6 describes the plausible test scenarios for demonstrat-
ing the INTERSECTION capabilities. Section 7 introduces
idea of converged security. Section 8 then presents security
as a service concept. We conclude in Section 9.
2. Related Work
In order to align the described INTERSECTION frame-
work with current state of the art research authors have
reviewed most related papers. The areas covered by ana-
lyzed papers span from describing technical solutions for
improving security: [1], [2], through business perspec-
tive: [3], [4], [5] ﬁnally to evaluation criteria. In [3] au-
thor describes ten aspects that should be taken into account
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when planning information security. It is interesting to
note that infrastructure, tools and supporting mechanisms
are the last items on the list of important factors to include.
According to author, even more important then security
mechanisms is the need for corporate governance responsi-
bility (security is a business issue and not technical issue)
as well as enforcement of information security compliance
and monitoring.
According to the autor, the latter are absolutely essential.
Framework for uniﬁed network security management is pre-
sented in [1]. This paper deﬁnes architecture of a uniﬁed
security management system for security framework for
converged networks. The framework is based on the fol-
lowing principles: coordination of heterogeneous detection
tools performing vulnerability and multistage attack anal-
ysis visualization and delivering strategic responses across
network boundaries. The architecture of the security frame-
work consists of 3 layers: scanning, modeling and applica-
tion. Scanning layer is monitoring traﬃc data from diﬀerent
types of network; it analyzes the data by using vulnerabil-
ity information and database in order to provide security
assessment. The modeling tier provides a functional rep-
resentation of weaknesses found on networks in the form
of requirements and impact. The application tier provides
a view of the security features of the network to help iden-
tifying potential threats to an enterprise. It provides an-
alytical and correlation tools which can be visualized to
provide administrators with information that allows to take
eﬀective decisions against security threats.
Similarly Onwubiko et al. in [2] propose integrated security
framework. The framework deﬁnes four types of compo-
nents: sensor components that contribute evidence about
security related events, analysis components that imple-
ment autonomous software agents capable of synthesizing
evidence, an abstract “security space” through which com-
ponents communicate and ﬁnally response components that
implement countermeasures. Response components can be
conﬁgured to incorporate human decision-making in pro-
tecting networks. The logical components of the frame-
work are realized on physical network nodes. A physical
network node may realize one or more logical components
and may interact with one or more security spaces. The
above framework follows the generic model for intrusion
detection presented in [6].
Hunter in [4] presents the Tivoli case to create an integrated
framework approach and the problems found when the com-
pany had to interoperate with other management products
not embraced by the framework. He underlines that inte-
gration is required and that there is a need for standards
and protocols that allow diﬀerent vendors to inter-operate
rather than having dedicated integration frameworks. In
addition, the idea of autonomic-management is presented,
even though the preliminary stage is to identify potential
security threats in advance and to alert security managers
so that proactive action can be taken. The longer term ob-
jective of the Tivoli case is to provide self healing security
management and to ﬁx problems automatically.
On the other hand authors in [5] show that although con-
ventional security solutions have been implemented as stan-
dalone systems, designed for solving very speciﬁc regional
problems it is feasible to create integrated security in-
frastructure with capabilities for dynamic and automatic
interaction between heterogeneous security devices. Pre-
sented solution combines ﬁrewall, intrusion prevention sys-
tem (IPS), vulnerability scanners and honeypot technolo-
gies to assure a security infrastructure. Each component
collaborates with the others in order to choose the best ac-
tion and to launch adequate countermeasures. Exchange
of security events between individual security components
allows automatic corrective action without user interven-
tion, while keeping the ability to adapt to an evolving envi-
ronment. Another possibility for improving security level
within large organizations is outsourcing.
Author in [7] state that security falls within the area that
does not lend itself well to outsourcing because it is too
closely tied to the running of the business. Moreover, Gart-
ner suggests that outsourcing security is not appropriate
for everyone and has developed decision framework to de-
termine whether in-house or outsourced security is more
appropriate [7]. The typical scope of security outsourc-
ing extends to: monitoring security architecture, continu-
ous conﬁguration of security infrastructure, prevention and
recovery of incidents. According to the author the major
beneﬁt of outsourcing is achieved when the scope of threats
is much larger than a company (operator) can provide in
its own right. Even if a company has resources to contin-
uously monitor all the events being generated it can only
correlate those events happening within its own perimeter.
3. Security Management Standards
The International Organization for Standardization oﬀers
suite of standards responsible for providing detailed guid-
ance on the security aspects of the management, operation
and use of information system networks, and their inter-
connections. Security requirements have been gathered in
the ISO/IEC series of standards addressing the following
areas:
– (ISO/IEC 18028-1) establishes network security re-
quirements and introduce possible control areas and
the speciﬁc technical areas,
– (ISO/IEC 18028-2) deﬁnes a standard security archi-
tecture,
– (ISO/IEC 18043) deﬁnes the methods for selecting,
deployment and operations of intrusion detection sys-
tem,
– (ISO/IEC 7498-2) the security issues that have to be
address within a security system.
Identiﬁcation and analysis of the communication related
factors that should be taken into account to establish net-
work security are the scope of the ISO/IEC 18028-1 stan-
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Fig. 1. Conceptual model of network security risk areas [8].
dard. These factors and the corresponding areas of risk are
depicted in the Fig. 1.
The results of security risks assessment of a network con-
nection depend on the type and number of networks com-
municating (e.g., WAN, WLAN, broadband, radio). Se-
lected key risk factors for each type of network are shown
in Table 1. When referring to Table 1 one should distin-
guish between threats and key risk factors. WLAN will
certainly be vulnerable to DoS attacks but the impact of
such is more severe in WAN or broadband. The same
applies for wireless networks. Although radio networks
share the same primary security risk with WLAN, there
are more prone to disruption due to the possibilities of
jamming the system and aﬀecting a considerably greater
Table 1
Key risk factors according to connection type [8]
Risk WAN WLAN Radio Broadband
Intrusion +
DoS + + +
Eavesdropping + +
Unauthorized access +
Misconﬁguration + +
Flawed WEP or TKIP +
Session hijacking +
Propagation of mali-
cious code
+
UL/DL of unautho-
rized access
+
number of users. Columns in the Table 1 represents the
key risks related to particular network whereas speaking
about connection that uses for instance WLAN and WAN
one should intersect risk factors from both networks. Each
risk factor represents certain threat to the system.
Fig. 2. Security conceptual architecture [10].
According to the ISO 7498-2:1989 speciﬁcation [9] various
threats may be grouped and categorized as follows:
– destruction of information and/or resources (I),
– corruption or modiﬁcation of information (II),
– theft, removal of loss of information and other re-
sources (III),
– disclosure of information (IV),
– interruption of services (V).
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Particular threats should be addressed by deﬁning a set
of principles that describe a security structure for the end-
to-end security solution. According to ISO/IEC 18028-2
the most generic security framework aimed at combating
broad range of threats can rely on the eight-dimensional
model as presented in Fig. 2. The ﬁgure depicts the concept
of protecting a network by deﬁning security dimensions at
each security plane of each security layer to provide com-
prehensive security solutions. Thus according to [10], to
be resilient, an end-to-end security solution must address
the spectrum of depictured areas and dimensions. Protec-
tion elements have to be placed throughout the network to
protect the company from malicious attacks. The target
coverage of threats by the well established security dimen-
sions in an organization is presented in Table 2.
Table 2
Threats and security dimension relation [10]
Security Security threat
dimension I II III IV V
Access control Y Y Y Y
Authentication Y Y
Non-repudiation Y Y Y Y Y
Data conﬁdentiality Y(∗) Y(∗)
Comm. ﬂow security Y Y
Data integrity Y(∗) Y(∗)
Avaliability Y(∗) Y(∗)
Privacy Y
(∗) feasible with IDS.
Network security is achieved by addressing a speciﬁc group
of threats (column name refers to the numbering in the
threat list above) with a security component or system
that provides functionalities described by given dimen-
sion (row). When mitigating particular risk with the proper
countermeasure a certain level of security is achieved –
which can further be extended by applying more mature so-
lutions and robust security components. A practical way to
enhance the security level is to introduce an intrusion detec-
tion system (IDS) in the network. IDS will, by deﬁnition,
cover certain threats in the context of eight-dimensional
security model (Table 2). According to [11] generic IDS
should address the authentication, integrity, conﬁdentiality
Fig. 3. Generic model of intrusion detection [6].
and availability dimensions as indicated by Table 2. It is
worth noticing that by addressing only four out of eight
security dimensions IDS can cover a complete spectrum of
security threats. A generic model for IDS deﬁned by [11]
is presented in Fig. 3.
The event detection module will gather data scattered
around the network; this will include information about
interfaces, traﬃc, active users and system logs. Data cor-
relation will take place inside the analysis block, where
patterns of properly functioning network will be deﬁned.
All data is stored in a data storage module. If an IDS
works in anomaly detection mode the system can compute
the traﬃc proﬁles for normal behavior and compare it to
ongoing traﬃc to determine possibility of an attack. Once
the attack is detected the IDS can in turn scan set of avail-
able countermeasures and with a presence of a response
module – reconﬁgure the network devices or interfaces to
slow down the attack, thus providing enough time for the
system administrator to trace the intrusion source. A secure
network may contain single IDS as well as multiple IDSes
spread through the network. Hierarchical architecture is
proposed in [11] for multiple IDS management as shown
in the Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. An intrusion detection management model [6].
The more data is gathered from agents for analysis the more
reliable decision can be made by manager and an ongo-
ing attack may be detected in less time. Thus according
to [6] it could be beneﬁcial for operators to share data
on intrusion information and interconnect their IDS. The
ISO/IEC 18043 advises such solution but also points out
that operators are not willing to give their knowledge of
intrusions that have aﬀected their IT systems to the public,
as it could reveal their business operations. This is even
more important when we take zero day exploits under con-
sideration. Well known worms like Witty or Slammer [12]
have caused tremendous ﬁnancial losses to many companies
around the world. Would the worms be more destructive
and target mostly critical infrastructure networks their im-
pact could be far more severe. The next section provides
use-case rationale for developing applied security infras-
tructure that is capable of aggregating and linking other-
wise unrelated events into a big picture view to increase
protection level.
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4. Rationale for INTERSECTION
On the 25th January 2003 a virus called Slammer (some-
times also Sapphire) started infecting hosts by exploiting
a buﬀer-overﬂow security hole in computers connected to
Internet that were running the Microsoft SQL server and
Microsoft SQL server desktop engine (MSDE) 2000 [12].
Once a host was infected the worm started scanning ran-
dom IP addresses to spread further. Figure 5 presents the
number of packets send by Slammer from infected loca-
tions during the ﬁrst 12 hours after activation. Because
Slammers behavior was highly anomalous (e.g., regarding
ampliﬁed traﬃc envelope) it could be detected by a method
called network telescope [12]. Success in suppresing the
virus was achieved by analyzing intrusion detection sys-
tem logs gathered from attacked companies and history of
events collected by NMS systems.
Fig. 5. The response to Slammer during the 12 hours after its
release [12].
Would the infected systems been able to exchange infor-
mation between diﬀerent companies IDS the worm could
have had respectively smaller impact and could have been
suppressed from spreading worldwide. The distributed IDS
could suﬃciently increase the security of network oper-
ator infrastructures engaged in a supporting communica-
tion with malicious traﬃc in-band. The data for analy-
sis could be spread through the network so if one opera-
tor would face the attack another one could beneﬁt from
his experience by exchanging information about pattern
of anomalous (attacked) traﬃc between IDS. The INTER-
SECTION framework among other goals aims at propos-
ing new anomaly detection algorithms as well as inves-
tigation of known algorithms [13] and providing a se-
curity framework that interconnects diﬀerent network op-
erators, which in turn allows exchanging traﬃc ﬂow in-
formation between them. This could lead to enhancing
the current security solutions by the factor proportional
to the synergic eﬀect of information exchange between
operators.
5. A View on INTERSECTION
The aim of the INTERECTION project is to come up with
speciﬁcations of an integrated framework for security and
resiliency in complex and heterogeneous communication
networks. Three objectives have been identiﬁed during the
architecture process:
– to deﬁne what data must be shared among security
systems of critical infrastructures and to specify hi-
erarchy of communication and rules for data access,
– to design an integrated framework for securing net-
worked systems,
– to specify appropriate protocols enabling communi-
cation between security systems in order to assure
interoperability in an inter-domain environment.
Figure 6 presents a general overview of the proposed IN-
TERSECTION framework. The INTERSECTION frame-
work includes the following components for: monitoring,
detection, reaction, remediation, visualization, and topol-
ogy discovery. Integration of these components and ex-
change of information between modules collecting data
from heterogeneous environments leads to improved net-
work protection and security for participating systems.
Monitoring, detection, reaction, and remediation compo-
nents cooperate in real time and in automated fashion.
These modules gather data from probes and network el-
ements, analyze it, detect intrusions and anomalies, and
select the most suitable reaction (e.g., reconﬁguration of
network components).
Remediation module is responsible for taking appropri-
ate action in order to prevent similar attacks in the fu-
ture. A network must operate at least one remediation
point (e.g., at a gateway) in order to eﬀect remedies,
but may operate several if appropriate (e.g., one per bor-
der router) or additional that actually exist in neighbor
networks (provided co-operation of those networks). The
INTERSECTION framework also includes oﬄine functions
aiming at using data coming from the network, or pro-
vided by the real-time elements, to help the human opera-
tor in analyzing the network state and to evaluate conﬁg-
uration changes implemented by remediation module. The
oﬄine functions include topology discovery, visualization
and anomaly detection. It is also important to highlight the
relevant protocols used for data exchange within INTER-
SECTION. These include: IDEMF and IPFIX. A short
description of each protocol is provided in the next two
subsections.
5.1. IDEMF
IDMEF is an XML domain speciﬁc language (DSL) for in-
trusion detection systems. Its purpose is to provide an ho-
mogeneous environment to improve the network security.
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Fig. 6. INTERSECTION framework.
Fig. 7. Usage of IDMEF in INTERSECTION.
Figure 7 shows how IDMEF format is used in INTER-
SECTION. The decision engine (DE) aggregates events
gathered from multiple probes (Host IDSes, Network ID-
Ses, DB monitors, etc.). Correlation of these events is per-
formed by complex event processor (CEP), namely Borealis
correlation engine, developed jointly by Brandeis Univer-
sity, Brown University and MIT.
IDMEF messages are used to transmit information from the
probes, and to send alerts to the remediation component.
5.2. IPFIX
IPFIX is an IETF working group standard [14]. It was
created from the need for a common, universal standard
for exporting the Internet protocol ﬂows information from
routers, probes, and other devices that are used by medi-
ation systems and network management systems to facili-
tate services such as measurement, accounting and billing.
Within INTERSECTION IPFIX was used for the measure-
ment task – a task that can be initiated by one of three
components: measurement controller, IDS or visualization.
Probes in INTERSECTION are called OpenIMP probes.
Figure 8 shows that the monitoring system uses multiple
measurement units (probes), which are distributed within
the network and passively monitor network traﬃc. In addi-
tion, the monitoring system includes a postprocessor, col-
lector, management and control interface.
The following section describes the proposed test scenarios
within INTERSECTION project.
6. Test Scenarios
The INTERSECTION deﬁned the suite of test scenarios
to evaluate performance and detection, remediation and
visualization capability of the proposed framework. This
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Fig. 8. Role of IPFIX in INTERSECTION.
section enumerates ﬁve diﬀerent demo scenarios that have
been designed to show how the INTERSECTION frame-
work can eﬀectively detect and resolve attacks by analyz-
ing diﬀerent pieces of information obtained from diﬀerent
networks. Furthermore, some scenarios show how the IN-
TERSECTION framework is capable of detecting attacks
by correlating data that, when analyzed separately would
not provide enough information to detect the attack and to
correct the system conﬁguration settings. Each one of the
ﬁve scenarios has been designed to be run over an intercon-
nected infrastructure, the INTERSECTION demo network
presented in Fig. 9, which is setup by the project part-
ners. This interconnection of networks is necessary since
an important premise, when designing the demo scenarios,
was heterogeneity. In fact, the heterogeneity in the demo
scenarios is addressed in the following ways:
• Each demo scenario involves at least two demo labs
of diﬀerent access technology interconnected, thus
showing that the designed INTERSECTION frame-
work can deal with access network heterogeneity.
The interconnected infrastructure of the diﬀerent
demo labs, called INTERSECTION demo network,
consists of ﬁve laboratories of diﬀerent communi-
cation technologies (including satellite, wireless and
wired networks) connected in a full-mesh network.
• Demo scenarios show how the INTERSECTION
framework combines detection techniques from dif-
ferent access technologies with other detection tech-
niques independent from the access technology, thus
providing a richer framework for detection of attacks.
Even if the attack exploits a vulnerability related
to a speciﬁc access technology, information from
other networks can contribute to the detection of the
attack.
The demo scenarios are based on exploiting speciﬁc vul-
nerabilities that are currently present in networks. In sum-
mary, a demonstration case is a realistic story about how
a vulnerability of a certain technology or equipment can be
exploited, how the attack will be detected, how some mech-
anisms will be activated to solve the attack and how this
process of detection and remediation can be shown to the
network administrator through a visualization framework.
Unlike a usual attack scenario, in these demo cases the at-
tack is not detected by just analyzing the network where the
Fig. 9. he INTERSECTION demonstrator.
attack is performed, but by correlating the information from
diﬀerent networks involved in the monitored environment.
The demo scenarios investigated by the INTERSECTION
project are:
– loss of access to a content provider by hijacking pre-
ﬁxes of its corresponding autonomous system,
– satellite PEP spooﬁng,
– multistage attack on high proﬁle roaming user and
his network,
– injection of bogus packets in a wireless sensor net-
work,
– distributed denial of service attack.
One of the INTERSECTION objectives is to show the ap-
plicability of the advanced decision support tools for miti-
gation, response and recovery in a heterogeneous environ-
ment. For this reason, a set of the aforementioned demo
scenarios have been identiﬁed. Even though INTERSEC-
TION is a research framework it is designed to be deployed
by any operator already using commercial solutions that are
incorporating IDMEF and IPFIX protocols.
7. Towards Converged Security
Numerous network security systems are currently available
on the market. Authors envisage two categories of systems:
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– systems that can manage one or more security areas,
but not the end-to-end security environment of the
organization,
– systems that have the capability of aggregating in-
formation from multiple sources and managing the
whole environment.
First branch of systems include (but is not limited to) net-
work access control, self-defending networks, and security
gateways whereas the second is focused on so called man-
agement solutions. The latter include COTS products used
for collecting, maintaining and reporting network traﬃc
providing services such as centralized log system, user no-
tiﬁcation, activity monitoring. It can be seen that INTER-
SECTION does not address all security issues like privacy,
communication ﬂow security, non-repudiation and access
control required for a complete security management sys-
tem. However, a strong correlation of INTERSECTION to
standard protocols for data exchange and proposed strategy
for interconnecting networks of independent operators and
their customers shows the way towards uniﬁed approach to
network security in our highly interconnected world. One
way to evaluate security solution is to map it against the
security maturity model. Attributes such as company size,
industry regulations, liability, technical complexity, culture,
risk tolerance, and the level of dependence on physical and
logical assets all create distinct requirements for risk man-
agement and security convergence. However, there are sev-
eral attributes common to a mature, converged security or-
ganization. In [15] maturity attributes of a company are
presented (Table 3).
Table 3
Converged security maturity attributes –
excerpt from [15]
Maturity attribute Defense-in-depth
Immature (ad hoc) There is no formal security
structure
Aware (repeatable but
intuitive)
Security is focused on perime-
ter defense
Management and risk-
based (deﬁned)
Safeguards extended beyond
the perimeter, but remain tech-
nically focused
Common (optimized) There is true defense-in-depth
encompassing people, policy,
and processes with technol-
ogy. Thrid-party and mobility
issues are included
INTERSECTION framework, while not covering some of
the aspects of the converged rank in maturity model in
some way may stretch the model beyond current deﬁnition.
INTERSECTION framework envisions participation in
a solution that not only includes internal policies and pro-
cesses of an organization but provides enhancements and
introduces capability possible only with a management so-
lution that is at a higher level than any of the connected
systems alone.
8. Security as a Service
As the software paradigm shifts towards cloud computing
the more important it appears not only to provide means
for better security but also to incorporate security solu-
tions that span across domains and gain from the knowl-
edge/experience of “ﬁrst” victims in order to protect others.
In computer networks there is a problem of extremely high
speed of data/message exchange between host/networks dur-
ing attack. The so called zero-day exploits are the eﬀects of
malicious activity of attackers that may aﬀect huge num-
ber of network users (from individual to corporational).
Thus important dimensions for improved threat detection
and prevention (also tolerance) are time and knowledge.
Time factor covers the time period to detect malicious ac-
tivity as well as time to ﬁnd and apply countermeasures
best matching to the context. On the other hand knowl-
edge sharing is essential in keeping security best practices
up to date each time security ﬂaw is detected and provid-
ing framework for building and exchanging rules to apply
(e.g., in the context of security threat) remediation pol-
icy of an organization. Some aspects limiting the proper
take-oﬀ of the 3S paradigm are related to both business
view (security maturity of an organization, information ex-
change strategy) and regulatory framework of a given coun-
try (obligation for anonymization of logs). Deployment of
INTERSECTION enables implementation of the paradigm
of security as a service external to an organization. One
can imagine that monitoring and decision engines are lo-
cated outside of a company network and managed by trusted
third party.
9. Conclusions
The growth of Internet connectivity results in increased
security requirements for enterprises to achieve services
availability as described by SLA agreements (for end users
and between operators). Inherent heterogeneity of the net-
works increases risk factor and new security threats emerge
due to the variety of network types and their vulnerabilities.
The solution proposed by INTERSECTION aims at provid-
ing security-level interoperability between many operators
using diﬀerent network technologies and diﬀerent security
solutions. The real beneﬁt of exploiting INTERSECTION
as an example of applied security framework paradigm can
be capitalized if the key operational assumptions are ful-
ﬁlled. The network owners and service providers should
agree on the need to foresee security related data exchange
as an important substrate of a successful security policy.
The wide spread of malicious code that is remotely com-
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manded to trigger distributed DoS attacks at any time de-
cided by a hacker, calls for the real cooperation that is
fostered by telecommunication regulatory institutions. Cur-
rently the Polish telecommunication law for instance states
that cooperation between telecommunication operators is
the obligation of the operator only at times of crisis situa-
tions [16]. So it is up to the operator to make its internal
information accessible for other operators. The continual
improvement (as a business process) of individual organi-
zations security infrastructure is essential but there is an
even more important aspect in holistic security supremacy
that is only possible when security information exchange
requirement is fulﬁlled. It should be at least as impor-
tant to investigate technology and business governance as
to formalize the need for decisions on security cooperation
in the process of managing and planning security. From
this perspective the meaning of the attribute of converged
security maturity of an organization is stretched as IN-
TERSECTION provides enhancements and introduces ca-
pability possible only with a management solution that
is at a higher level than any of the connected systems
alone.
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